Field notes
What building it taught us
Threshold cryptography fails in ways ordinary key management does not, and the error messages rarely name the cause. These are the write-ups, including the expensive ones.
Taking the central authority out of your app
Every app has a process that can read every row. Here is what moves off your server when a threshold of nodes holds the key instead, and what that changes about asking people to trust you.
The first policy is the only one that pack will ever sign
Two paid vendor keys went in the bin teaching us this. The authorizer pack is spent on one attempt, per node, whether or not the signature succeeds.
What a stolen database looks like
The notes demo writes a row, prints the table, and then asks the network to sign a payment it should not sign. Both halves in about four minutes.
Want one of these on a topic? Open an issue on GitHub and say what you are stuck on. The posts here started as answers to questions people asked twice.